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Abstract. The aim of this paper is twofold: to propose the model of artificial prediction 
markets that capture the characteristics of real prediction markets and to study the impact 
of key parameters on the performance of the proposed markets. In the experiments, the 
artificial markets are implemented and the market performance in terms of convergence 
speed is measured. Our experimental results show that the number of traders and the 
mean value of initial belief have no significant impact on the convergence speed. However, 
the trader’s memory size impacts negatively on the convergence because of its delay in 
adjusting to the true value. Finally, the external information transmission rate and the ratio 
of smart traders have positive impacts on the convergence of the prediction markets. The 
insights can assist a market maker in designing and constructing more efficient prediction 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Predicting outcomes of the future events with high accuracy is always an interesting and challenging 
problem. Several techniques have been developed to achieve this goal, such as opinion poll, Delphi method, 
and traditional assessment of experts. Prediction markets are recent methodology, where speculative 
markets are created to predict an outcome by trading contracts in the markets. Trading behavior of the 
traders determines the market price, and the price yields certain information on the outcome, such as the 
probability that the specified outcome is true. For example, in the prediction markets with the winner-
takes-all contract, participants may receive $1 if and only if a specified candidate wins an election and $0 
otherwise. Thus, participants who believe with 80% certainty that the candidate will be elected should be 
willing to buy the contract at the price of 80 cents or lower. Various experiments have shown that the 
accuracy of this technique is at least equivalent to other techniques with similar pool of participants [1]. 
Many well-known international firms use prediction markets for their internal decisions. Hewlett-Packard 
Corporation uses this technique to forecast sales [2].  Eli Lilly uses markets to predict the chance of new 
drugs passing the product test [3-4]. Google has run a number of prediction markets to forecast company 
performance and industry trends [5]. Apart from prediction results, prediction markets also show the flow 
of information within the organization [6]. 
In general, two main approaches exist to study prediction markets. One is to create and experiment on 
real prediction markets. The other is to study via artificial prediction markets, which are virtual markets 
implemented on a computer where trading is done by computer-generated agents. The first option faces 
numerous problems, such as whether the prediction markets are against the law of that country, how to 
control participants, the magnitude and certainty of cost to the market maker, etc. Therefore, gaining 
insights on how to design the prediction markets via the latter option offers more control, convenience, 
and cost effectiveness. This paper proposes the model of artificial prediction markets that capture the 
characteristics of real prediction markets. The agents in these markets also update their belief towards the 
specified event according to their prior beliefs, the recently received information, and the market price.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of the prediction markets and 
the artificial markets. The proposed market mechanism is thoroughly explained in section 3. Section 4 
describes the experimental parameter setting and performance measurement. Section 5 presents analyses on 
the impact of key parameters, such as the number of traders, the mean value of initial belief, the memory 
pool size, the transmission rate and the ratio of innovators. Finally, section 6 offers the insights on how to 
calibrate those parameters in order to optimize the convergence of the markets to the real price. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Prediction Markets 
 
Prediction markets are speculative markets that aim to predict future outcome of interest, such as a 
presidential election, expected profit, and a project deployment date by gathering information from 
participants. Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), one of the first prediction markets, has been introduced by 
University of Iowa, aiming to predict the results of US presidential election [7]. After Berg et al. have 
concluded data from IEM that prediction markets outperformed polling organizations and forecasted very 
accurately, prediction markets have gained much attention [7]. Researchers have adopted prediction 
markets as a forecasting tool in many areas, such as politics [7], health care [8], and project management [9]. 
Ritterman et al. [8] have used prediction markets together with Twitter to find the probability that Swine 
Flu virus will become a plague and this approach had higher accuracy than some baseline methods. 
Remidez and Joslin [9] have adapted prediction markets to help improve project communication which is a 
substantial factor for effective project management [10]. Moreover, Prediction markets can also be used for 
other purposes, such as supporting decision making [11] and assessing information quality [12]. 
Polgreen [13] have stated four reasons why prediction markets are accurate. First, the knowledge 
discovered by prediction markets is derived from all participants, each of whom may have different 
opinions on particular events. Second, prediction markets support intelligent participants to trade 
frequently through the incentive scheme. Third, this technique provides feedback from other’s beliefs to 
participants. Participants learn from the market price and feel motivated to gain more information. Finally, 
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participants can trade anonymously in the prediction markets; consequently, they tend to share more 
information that they may not otherwise share publicly. 
There exist many contract types but the popular one that will be used in our experiments is called 
“winner-takes-all” [14]. This contract pays $1 if the specified event occurs and $0 otherwise. The traders 
who believe that the event will occur will buy the contracts, which in turn drives the market price up. On 
the contrary, the traders believe otherwise will sell the contracts once the market price is too high thus 
driving the price down. The final market price reflects the probability that the event will be true, according 
to the belief of the crowd. 
 
2.2. Trading Mechanisms 
 
There are four main trading mechanisms used in the prediction markets: Continuous Double Auction 
(CDA) [15-16], Market Scoring Rule (MSR) [14, 17-18], Pari-Mutuel (PM) [3, 19], and Dynamic Pari-Mutuel 
(DPM) [19].  In CDA markets, all bids and offers are maintained in the order book. Trading is executed 
only when the buyer’s bids and the seller’s offers are matched. At any time, both buyers and sellers can 
update their bids or offers. Market operators are free of financial risk because it simply matches 
corresponding sellers and buyers. MSR is developed to address the liquidity problem in CDA. In MSR 
markets, buying and selling can be done at any time with the market maker and the market price is adapted 
automatically due to the number of contracts in the market. In PM markets, participants bet on the fixed 
outcome pool and participants who bet on a right pool will divide the total proceedings among themselves 
after management cost is subtracted. One main problem with this mechanism is that many participants will 
delay buying the contracts until almost near the market closing because new information may arise before 
the market closes and there is no benefit in buying the contract early. Pennock [19] has developed DPM in 
order to benefit from limitless liquidity of PM and allow the market price to change as a result of new 
information. In DPM markets, traders can buy any outcome they want at a certain price but selling can be 
executed only via CDA mechanism with limited liquidity; therefore, DPM serves as a hybrid between CDA 
and PM. 
In our experiments, we implement MSR markets, as it is highly popular in practice due to its simplicity 
and liquidity. Klingert and Meyer [20] have compared an impact of CDA and MSR mechanics on the 
number of trades, the accuracy, and the standard deviation of price. They have concluded that the 
advantages of MSR over CDA include higher number of trades and less standard deviation of price; 
however, accuracy is independent of trading mechanisms. MSR facilitates more trades because CDA needs 
at least two traders to execute a trade, while MSR needs only one trader, thus leading to higher liquidity. 
Moreover, the mechanism to calculate the market price by considering all past trades of MSR reduces a 
magnitude of price changes resulting in a lower standard deviation. 
 
2.3. Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules (LMSR) 
 
LMSR [17, 21] originates from logarithmic scoring rule; thus, the cost function and the price function are in 
logarithmic form. Cost function is a function for calculating the cost of buying or selling a certain number 
of contracts as shown in Eq. (1). Price function is used to calculate the spot price of the contract as shown 
in Eq. (2). A spot price will increase if a trader buys a contract and will decrease if a trader sells a contract, 
following the same logic as in the real market. 
 
Cost Function: 
                                                    𝐶(?⃑?𝑡) = 𝑏 • ln⁡(∑ 𝑒
𝑞𝑗,𝑡/𝑏)𝑗∈𝑁     (1) 
 
The amount of money a trader must pay or receive for each trade is 𝐶(?⃑?𝑡) – 𝐶(?⃑?𝑡−1). N is the number of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes. ?⃑?𝑡⁡  = (𝑞1,𝑡, 𝑞2,𝑡, … , 𝑞𝑁,𝑡)⁡ is the vector of the number of 
shares on the market for each of the N outcomes after the tth trade in the market. b is the liquidity 
parameter, which is determined by the market maker. 
 
Price Function: 
                     𝑃𝑖(𝑞𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ) = 
𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡/𝑏
∑ 𝑒
𝑞𝑗,𝑡/𝑏
𝑗∈𝑁
     (2) 
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𝑃𝑖(𝑞𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ) is a spot price of 𝑖
𝑡ℎ outcome. ?⃑?𝑡 ⁡ = (𝑞1,𝑡, 𝑞2,𝑡, … , 𝑞𝑁,𝑡)⁡is the vector of the number of shares on 
the market for each of the N outcomes after the tth trade in the market. b is the liquidity parameter, which 
is determined by the market maker. 
For example, the market maker creates the prediction markets with two choices and sets liquidity 
parameter (b) to 100. At the beginning, if a trader buys five contracts of the first outcome, then he has to 
pay 𝐶(5, 0) – 𝐶(0, 0) = [100 x ln⁡(𝑒5/100 + 𝑒0/100)] – [100 x ln⁡(𝑒0/100 + 𝑒0/100)] = $2.531. The market 
price of the first outcome contract will increase from 0.5 to 𝑃1 =  
𝑒5/100
⁡𝑒5/100+𝑒0/100
 = $0.512. 
 
2.4. Artificial Markets 
 
Artificial markets are computer-simulated markets with electronic agents acting as traders participating in 
the markets. This kind of traders can use heuristics, mathematical equations, or machine learning 
techniques to imitate human’s decision process. Artificial markets are popularly used in finance area 
because artificial markets can model the empirical interactions of traders in financial markets [22]. LeBaron 
[23] has also explained why artificial markets are frequently used in financial experiments. Financial setting 
offers clear objectives of agents and information aggregation methods, while financial data is also readily 
available and can be accessed easily. Moreover, the advancement in experimental financial markets with 
controlled environments makes a comparison with artificial markets reasonable.  
Most research in artificial markets can be divided into two fields [24]. The first field focuses on creating 
a successful market mechanism and its environment. For example, Qin (2006) has used artificial markets 
with heterogeneous agents to find the market mechanism that minimize Smith’s coefficient of convergence 
and found Continuous Double Auction (CDA) or English Auction (EA) to be the most appropriate for the 
given supply-demand schedules. The other field concentrates on the dynamics of price that are generated 
by these markets in order to replicate some characteristics of real financial markets. For example, Raberto et 
al. [25] have implemented artificial financial markets which are populated with heterogeneous agents and 
used Genoa market microstructure to capture leptokurtic return distributions and volatility clustering.  
On applying artificial markets to prediction markets environment, Toriumi and Ishii [26] have used 
artificial markets to study the conditions that make prediction markets more effective than opinion polls. 
They have run a number of artificial prediction markets to analyze the influences of information frequency, 
innovators, and motivation rate by using the difference between real price and the final market price of 
prediction markets as a measure. Their results have shown that the important factors are the presence of 
innovators (intelligent traders) and a low motivation rate, while both prediction markets and opinion polls 
benefit from high information frequency. This research serves as a framework for our proposed artificial 
prediction markets. 
 
3. The Proposed Artificial Prediction Markets 
 
Our goal is to propose the design for an artificial prediction markets using MSR and to provides insights on 
how to calibrate various parameters for market performance. Our proposed markets design is based on 
Toriumi and Ishii [26] information distribution approach and certain assumptions about traders. 
Specifically, the information is distributed to traders at a transmission frequency with the information 
attributes. The traders are modeled with the same five basic attributes, as explained later. 
However, this paper takes on several key different assumptions about the trader’s belief and trading 
behavior. First the previous paper has assumed that the agents or participants in the real world come into 
the markets with no prior beliefs or expectations, but in our proposed model all agents are assumed to 
possess certain initial beliefs towards the specified event. Second, instead of agents updating their belief 
solely on an external information, our model incorporates their prior belief and the market price as 
additional important factors to calculate the predicted price. The third extension is on the trading behavior. 
Toriumi and Ishii (2011) have assumed that if the predicted price is higher than the market price, the agents 
will sell the contract because they think that the price will fall soon. Or if the market price exceeds the 
predicted price, they will buy the contract. However, this paper proposes that the agents execute their 
transactions based on their beliefs with a goal to generate a profit. Specifically, if the predicted price is 
higher than the market price, the agents will buy the contracts due to the belief that the market price should 
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rise soon. If the market price exceeds the predicted price, the agents will sell the contracts, as the contracts 
are currently over-valued. 
Our simulation will create automated prediction markets that are populated with traders. The traders 
will then receive information from the market maker, update their beliefs, and make a decision to buy or 
sell the contracts until the indicated number of steps is reached. Traders’ behavior is a key factor that 
determines the effectiveness of the markets. Sections below explain the mechanisms of the proposed 
artificial prediction markets in detail. 
 
3.1. Prediction Goal 
 
The simulation is used to investigate the traders’ ability to receive and comprehend information on the real 
price of the contract, which is a real number between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive, and also to study the 
effectiveness of the market mechanism to extract the wisdom of the crowd. For example, given a real price 
of 0.8, the market price after traders have executed some tradings should eventually reach 0.8.  
 
3.2. Information Distribution Approach 
 
In each step, the information about the real price of the contract will be distributed to every trader at a 
certain probability called a transmission rate, between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive. Each piece of information has 
the following attributes: 
 
1. Type of information (m) is an integer of value 0 or 1 that shows negativity or positivity of the 
information. For example, if the real price is 0.8, an average 80% of the information will show positivity 
(m=1) and 20% of the information will show negativity (m=0). 
 
2. Difficulty level (d) is a real number between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive that represents the difficulty of the 
information. The difficulty models characteristics in the real world where information is sometimes harder 
or easier to comprehend by general public. 
 
3.3. Trader Modeling 
 
During the simulation, each trader decides to buy or sell a contract by comparing his belief with the market 
price. Each trader has the following attributes:  
 
1. Smartness (s) is a real number between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive that shows trader’s ability to comprehend 
the information. In this experiment, we divide traders by their smartness into two groups. The first group 
with smartness between 0.8 and 1.0 inclusive represents innovators who can understand almost every 
received information. The second group represents normal traders whose smartness is between 0.0 and 0.2 
inclusive. Traders can comprehend the information if and only if the below inequality is true. 
 
s > d       (3)  
 
2. Trading frequency (f) is a real number between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive that shows the probability that each 
trader will trade in this step. This parameter reflects uncertainty in human’s behavior. They only trade when 
they want to do so. 
 
3. Motivation rate (h) is a real number between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive that shows the motivation to trade. All 
traders’ motivation rate is set to a constant value throughout the experiments. When traders cannot 
comprehend the information, the trading frequency will be multiplied by the motivation rate in order to 
lessen the traders’ probability to trade as follows. 
 
𝑓𝑡+1 = 𝑓𝑡 • h      (4) 
 
4. Memory pool (p) is a limited-size FIFO (first in first out) memory used to store the received information 
type value. When the trader comprehends the information, the information type is put into an empty slot 
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of this memory pool. When the memory pool is full, new incoming data will replace the oldest data in the 
memory pool. Similar to human behavior, we can remember only a certain amount of information. 
 
5. Belief (b) is a real number between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive that shows the trader’s belief towards the event 
or the predicted price of the contract. We propose the trader’s belief to depend on his prior belief, previous 
information and the current market price. Therefore, our proposed belief will be recalculated over time as a 
weighted average among these factors, as shown in the following equation. 
 
𝑏𝑡+1      =      𝑥1 (𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑡) + 𝑥2 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦⁡𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙) + 𝑥3 (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)  (5) 
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 = 1 
 
𝑥𝑖 is a weight representing the contribution of each factor in updating the trader’s belief. 
 
3.4. Trading Mechanism 
 
First, all traders’ beliefs will be initiated from a normal random variable with a certain mean and variance to 
represent a range of beliefs at a certain mean. Next, information will be distributed to all traders based on a 
transmission frequency. When the trader receives an information, he will compare his smartness (s) with 
the information’s difficulty level (d). If the inequality (3) is true, the trader can comprehend the information 
and will put the information’s type value into his memory pool. His trading frequency will be set to 1.0 
which means that he will trade on the next step because he just received new information. On the contrary, 
if he cannot comprehend the information, his trading frequency will be decreased by a factor of his 
motivation rate according to Eq. (4), as receiving unclear information may deter one’s action. 
Next, he will update his belief based on Eq. (5). He will then decide whether to trade in this step, based 
on his trading frequency. If he decides to trade, he will compare his predicted price or his current belief 
with the market price. If his predicted price is higher than the market price, he will buy the contract because 
he believes that the real price of the contract should be higher than the current price, so the market price 
will rise. On the other hand, if the market price is higher than his predicted price, he will sell the contract 
because he believes that the market price is too high, and it will likely decline. We can summarize the 
inequalities that the traders use to buy, sell, or hold the contract as follows: 
 
Buy if  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 > 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒      (6) 
Sell if  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 < 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒      (7) 
Hold if     𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒      (8) 
 
Figure 1 shows the flow of the proposed prediction markets. At the beginning, all traders’ beliefs are 
initialized from a random normal distribution with certain mean and variance. At the beginning of each 
step, information about the outcome will be sent to all traders at a constant transmission rate. Traders then 
update their beliefs using Eq. (5) before they decide to buy or sell the contracts according to inequalities (6), 
(7) and Eq. (8). Their trading behavior determines the new market price which is one of the factors used to 
calculate their beliefs in the next round. This cycle repeats until a specified number of steps is reached. 
 
4. Experimental Parameters And Performance Measurement 
 
We implement artificial prediction markets in JAVA and perform sensitivity analysis on various parameters 
in order to study the impact of each parameter to the market performance. 
 
4.1. Experimental Parameters 
 
The parameter setting of the base simulation is shown in Table 1. We will analyze the performance of the 
traders and the market mechanism on its convergence to the real price of 0.8. There are 3000 steps in each 
simulation. A step is a cycle when all traders are given information, decide whether to trade, transact if 
appropriate, and lastly update their beliefs. In the real world, a step can be a day or half a day. The model 
simulates 100 traders, 50 normal traders and 50 innovators, participating in the markets. This mix reflects 
existence of people who understand most of information they receive and people who may not in the real 
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world. Each trader’s initial belief is drawn from a normal random distribution with mean = 0.6 and variance 
= 0.04. Trader’s memory pool size is 100 and the transmission rate and the motivation rate are 0.5. The 
liquidity parameter (b) of the market is set to 100. This parameter determines the liquidity of the markets, 
the cost to the market maker, and adaptability of the price. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Flow of the proposed artificial prediction markets. 
 
Table 1. Base-case parameter setting. 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Real price  0.8 Mean 0.6 
Number of steps 3000 Variance 0.04 
Number of traders 100 Memory pool size 100 
Ratio of innovators 0.5 Transmission rate 0.5 
Liquidity parameter (b) 100 Motivation rate 0.5 
 
4.2. Performance Measurement 
 
In this simulation, the market performance is measured by the steps to convergence. We define the steps to 
convergence as the number of steps it takes until the market price changes within one percent of the real 
price for ten consecutive steps. Given that the markets open only on weekdays, ten consecutive steps can 
be interpreted as two weeks, which represents a reasonable period to conclude its convergence to the real 
price. This value is averaged over 100 simulations. Measuring the market performance using speed to 
convergence is appropriate because in practice time to open the prediction markets is often limited. 
Therefore, the market price’s fast convergence to the real price is highly beneficial practically. 
 
5. Experimental Results 
 
In this section, we explore the impact of each parameter on the performance of the artificial prediction 
markets. Five key parameters that we analyze includes the number of traders, the mean value of initial belief, 
the memory pool size, the ratio of innovators, and the transmission rate. By understanding the impact of 
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these parameters, the market creator can design more effective prediction markets that can forecast the real 
price efficiently.  
 
5.1. Number of Traders 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the number of steps to convergence and the number of traders 
over 100 simulations. We observe that the number of traders participating in the prediction markets has no 
significant impact on the convergence speed. Figure 3 illustrates the price dynamics for various numbers of 
traders. During the first few steps, a higher number of traders leads to a faster approach to the real price 
because starting with a relatively low market price, every trader buys the contract until the price approaches 
the true value. Nonetheless, regardless of how many traders participate in the markets, it must take a certain 
amount of time for the traders to absorb the external information and adjust to the true value. We can 
observe from Figs. 2 and 3 that the market price converges to the real price at almost the same time (over 
200 steps from the beginning to reach within one percent from the true value). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Number of steps to convergence at various numbers of traders. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Market price over time with 20, 100, and 180 traders. 
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5.2. Mean Value of Initial Belief 
 
The relationship between the number of steps to convergence and the mean value of initial belief is shown 
in Fig. 4. This mean value represents an average of traders’ belief coming into the prediction markets. The 
mean value of the initial belief has no significant impact on the convergence. Figure 5 illustrates the price 
dynamics for various mean values. Regardless of the initial value, the market price approaches the real value 
almost at the same time because this initial belief quickly changes over time according to the belief update 
model (Eq. (5)).   
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Number of steps to convergence at various means of initial belief. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Market price over time when the mean of initial belief is 0.0, 0.4, and 0. 
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right direction, the market price will converge quickly within a few hundred steps. On the contrary, should 
the first set of external information lead the market in the wrong direction, the larger memory pool size will 
delay the trader’s belief update, leading to slower convergence. Overall, a small memory pool size leads to a 
faster convergence. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Number of steps to convergence at various memory pool sizes. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Price calculated from external information over time at memory pool size of 100 and 600. 
 
5.4. Ratio of Innovators 
 
To show the impact of having smart people in the crowd on the convergence speed, we alter the ratio of 
innovators from 0.0 to 1.0 in Fig. 8. We can observe that the higher ratio of innovators, the faster the 
market converges to the real price because a higher ratio of innovators means that more traders can 
comprehend the information. Figure 9 also emphasizes that the presence of innovators is an important 
factor to reach the true value. The more traders comprehend the information, the more people update their 
beliefs to correspond to the real price. The number of steps to convergence decreases dramatically when 
the ratio of innovators is low (less than 0.5). As the ratio of innovators increases beyond 0.5, the 
convergence speed improves but not substantially. Therefore, increasing the proportion of smart people 
when very few exist offers a large impact. Increasing the proportion of smart people when most are already 
smart only provides incremental benefits as shown at the tail end of the graph in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8. Number of steps to convergence at various ratios of innovators. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Market price over time at the ratio of innovators of 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0. 
 
5.5. Transmission Rate 
 
Finally, we show the relationship between the number of steps to convergence and the transmission rate in 
Fig. 10. When we increase the transmission rate from 0.1 to 1.0, we can observe that the higher the 
transmission rate, the faster the market converges to the real price. For example, from Fig. 11 with the 
transmission rate of 0.9, the market price quickly approaches the real price because the traders can receive 
more information. On the contrary, with the transmission rate of 0.1 the market price takes a long time to 
approach 0.8 since the traders rarely receive information related to the real price. Therefore, the 
transmission rate has a strong positive impact on the prediction markets. The more information (on the 
true value) the participants receive, the faster the market converges. Thus, it is vital to construct the 
prediction markets in the real world that allows for efficient and effective communications. 
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Fig. 10. Number of steps to convergence at various transmission rates. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Market price over time at the transmission rate of 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. 
 
6. Insights and Conlclusion on Optimizing Market Parameters 
 
Prediction markets are widely used by many large organizations all over the world. Creating an effective 
prediction market depends on many factors. Our study of the market performance through the artificial 
prediction markets offer many insights relating to the impacts of key parameters in the market design. Since 
most of the events we want to forecast have limited time for market opening; these guidelines lead to a 
better market design that can forecast accurately within the time limit.  
First of all, the experimental results have shown that the price convergence benefits from the ratio of 
innovators or smart traders. Moreover, the number of traders has no obvious effect on the convergence 
speed. In other words, regardless of the number of traders participating in the market; the market price 
converges to the real price at a relatively similar speed. Hence, we can conclude that, given the true and 
accurate information is being disseminated, the market maker should focus on incorporating smart 
participants that can grasp this new information and trade accordingly instead of aiming for a large number 
of participants.  
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Second, the traders’ initial beliefs have no significant impact on the market performance. These initial 
values will be used during the first period and then replaced by the new beliefs which are calculated from 
the current beliefs together with the external information and the market price. Thus, the market maker 
should aim to recruit smart people with ability to learn instead of people with initial correct beliefs but 
unwilling to learn or adapt to the new information. 
Third, from our analyses the memory pool size has a negative impact on the convergence because a 
large memory pool size tends to delay the traders in adjusting their predicted price to the real price. In other 
words, remembering too much can be damaging if earlier information is not accurate. 
Last but not least, the higher the transmission rate, the faster the market price converges to the real 
price. When we increase the transmission rate from 0.0 to 0.5, the number of steps to convergence 
decreases dramatically; however, after the transmission rate reaches 0.5, the incremental gain slows down. 
Therefore, it is important for the market maker to encourage information related to the real price to be 
distributed as frequently as possible because information is the key knowledge that allows the traders to 
move in the right direction. 
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